DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM-BASED SECURITY FOR ELECTRONIC MAIL

William C. Barker Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology

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This revision incorporates comments from the public.





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NCCoE building blocks address technology gaps that affect multiple industry sectors.

ABSTRACT

The Domain Name System-Based Security for Electronic Mail project will produce a proof of concept security platform that will demonstrate trustworthy email exchanges across organizational boundaries. The product of the project will include authentication of mail servers, signing and encryption of email, and binding cryptographic key certificates to the servers. Domain Name System Security Extension (DNSSEC) protocols will be used to authenticate server addresses and certificates by binding the X.509 certificates used for Transport Layer Security (TLS) to DNS names verified by DNSSEC. The business value of the security platform that will result from this project will not only improve privacy and security protection for users' operations, but will also expand the set of available DNS security applications and encourage wider implementation of the protocols that provide Internet users confidence that entities to which they believe they are connecting are the entities to which they are actually connecting. This project will result in one or more demonstration prototype DNS-based secure email platforms, a publicly available NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide that explains how to employ the platform(s) to meet Federal and industry security and privacy requirements, platform documentation necessary to compose a DNS-based email security platform from offthe-shelf components, and any recommendations for improvements to applicable standards documentation. The secure email project will involve composition of a variety of components that will be provided by a number of different vendors. Client systems, DNS/DNSSEC services, mail transfer agents, and certificate providers (Certificate Authorities or CAs) are included. The NCCOE is currently entering into cooperative research and development agreements with technology providers for components and expertise including DNS resolvers (stub and recursive) for DNSSEC, authoritative DNS servers for DNSSEC signed zones, mail servers and mail security components, and extended validation and domain validation TLS certificates.

Keywords

cryptographic key, cryptography, Domain Name System (DNS), DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC), electronic mail (email), privacy, security

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COMMENTS ON NCCOE DOCUMENTS

Organizations are encouraged to review all draft project publications during public comment periods and provide feedback. All publications from NIST's National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence are available at <u>http://nccoe.nist.gov</u>.

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1 **1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

2 Both public and private sector business operations are heavily reliant on electronic mail 3 (email) exchanges. The need to protect business plans and strategies; the integrity of 4 transactions, financial, and other proprietary information; and privacy of employees and 5 clients are only three of the factors that motivate organizations to secure their email 6 exchanges. Whether the security service desired is authentication of the source of an 7 email message, assurance that the message has not been altered by an unauthorized 8 party, or confidentiality of message contents, cryptographic functions are usually 9 employed in providing the service. Economies of scale and a need for uniform security 10 implementation drive most enterprises to rely on mail servers and/or Internet service 11 providers (ISPs) to provide security to the members of an enterprise rather than end-to-12 end security mechanisms operated by individual users. Many current server-based email 13 security mechanisms are vulnerable to, and have been defeated by, attacks on the 14 integrity of the cryptographic implementations on which they depend. The 15 consequences frequently involve unauthorized parties being able to read or modify 16 supposedly secure information, or to use email as a vector for inserting malware into 17 the system that is intended to deny access to critical information or processes or to 18 damage or destroy system components and/or information. Improved email security 19 can help protect organizations and individuals against these consequences and also 20 serve as a marketing discriminator for email service providers while also improving the 21 trustworthiness of enterprise email exchanges.

22 Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) for the Domain Name System (DNS) 23 are technical mechanisms employed by Internet service providers to protect against 24 unauthorized modification to the DNS, the system which converts domain names (e.g., 25 .com, .gov, .org) to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. DNS-based Authentication of 26 Named Entities (DANE) is a protocol that securely associates domain names with 27 cryptographic certificates and related security information so that they can't be 28 fraudulently modified or replaced to breach security. In spite of the dangers of failure to 29 authenticate the identities of network devices, adoption of DNSSEC has been slow. 30 Demonstration of DANE-supported applications such as reliably secure email may 31 support increased user demand for domain name system security. Follow-on projects 32 might include HTTPS, IOT, IPSEC keys in DNS, and DNS service discovery.

The current project will demonstrate a proof-of-concept security platform, composed of off-the-shelf components, that provides trustworthy mail server-to-mail server email exchanges across organizational boundaries. The DANE protocol will initially be used to authenticate servers and certificates in two roles in the DNS-Based Security for Email Project:

- 38 By binding the X.509 certificates used for
- Transport Layer Security (TLS) to DNS names verified by DNSSEC and supporting
 the use of these certificates in the mail server-to-mail server communication;

Secure Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) to email
 addresses encoded as DNS names verified by DNSSEC.

43 These bindings support trust in the use of S/MIME certificates in the end-to-end email communication. The resulting building block will encrypt email traffic between servers, 44 45 allow individual email users to digitally sign and/or encrypt email messages to other end 46 users, and allow individual email users to obtain other users' certificates in order to 47 validate signed email or send encrypted email. The project will include an email sending 48 policy consistent with a stated privacy policy that can be parsed by receiving servers so 49 that receiving servers can apply the correct security checks and report back the 50 correctness of the email stream. Documentation of the resulting platform will include 51 statements of the security and privacy policies and standards (e.g., Executive Orders, 52 NIST standards and guidelines, IETF RFCs) supported, technical specifications for

- 53 hardware and software, implementation requirements, and a mapping of
- 54 implementation requirements to the applicable policies, standards, and best practices.

55 The secure email project will involve composition of a variety of components that will be

56 provided by a number of different vendors. Client systems, DNS/DNSSEC services, mail

57 transfer agents, and certificate providers (CAs) are generally involved. Collaborators are

58 being sought to provide components and expertise for DNS resolvers (stub and

59 recursive) for DNSSEC, authoritative DNS servers for DNSSEC signed zones, S/MIME

60 certificates mail servers and mail security components, extended validation and domain

61 validation TLS certificates. Although this initial project description focuses on SMTP over

62 TLS and S/MIME, it does not necessarily rule out inclusion of other off-the-shelf

63 standards-based components and capabilities that are compatible with DNSSEC.

- 64 Comments and suggestions regarding approaches to achieving the project goal are
- 65 solicited.
- 66 This project will result in one or more demonstration prototype DNS-based secure email
- 67 platforms, a publicly available NIST Cybersecurity Practice Guide that explains how to
- 68 employ the platform(s) to meet security and privacy requirements, and platform
- 69 documentation necessary to compose a DNS-based email security platform from off-
- 70 the-shelf components.
- 71 This project description includes
- a statement of the business value to be derived from adoption and use of the building block
- a description of the purpose of, scope of, and assumptions underlying the
 project
- 3. usage scenarios to be demonstrated in the course of the building block project
- 4. our current perception of the challenges to our meeting the project goals
- 5. standards and policies that will be used by the project team to inform projectactivities

- 80 6. characteristics of the products of the project
- 7. identification of security categories in the Framework for Improving Critical
 Infrastructure Cybersecurity (CSF) that adoption of the building block will help
 organizations to satisfy
- 84 8. a high-level diagram of email functionality where DNS-based security for email is
 85 used
- 86 9. a list of anticipated building block project components

87 A general description of threats to server-based email exchanges and potential

88 consequences of exploitation of unprotected email and email whose protection has

89 been bypassed or defeated is included as Appendix A.

90 1.1 Business Value

91 Sectors across industries, as well as the federal government, are concerned about email 92 security and the use of email as an attack vector. Both public and private sector business 93 operations are heavily reliant on email exchanges. The need to protect business plans 94 and tactics; the integrity of transactions, financial and other proprietary information; 95 and privacy of employees and clients are among the factors that motivate organizations 96 to secure their email. Whether the service desired is authentication of the source of an 97 email message, assurance that the message has not been altered by an unauthorized party, or message confidentiality, cryptographic functions are usually employed. 98 99 Economies of scale and a need for uniform implementation drive most enterprises to 100 rely on mail servers to provide security to the members of an enterprise rather than end-to-end security operated by individual users. Many server-based email security 101 102 mechanisms are vulnerable to attacks involving

- 103 faked or fraudulent key certificates
- otherwise invalid certificates
- failure to actually invoke a security process as a result of connection to or through a fraudulent server.¹

107 The consequences often involve unauthorized reading or modification of information or 108 fraudulently causing legitimate parties to bypass the protection mechanisms altogether. 109 Worse, users continue to click on links to malware-ridden websites in fraudulent emails, 110 a major factor in most confirmed data breaches. Improved email security can both serve 111 as a marketing discriminator for email service providers and improve the security of 112 enterprise email exchanges. DNSSEC protects against unauthorized modifications to 113 network management information and host IP addresses. In spite of the dangers of

failure to authenticate the identities of network devices, adoption of DNSSEC has been

¹ "How Cybercrime Exploits Digital Certificates," Infosec Instutute, General Security, July 28, 2014, http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/cybercrime-exploits-digital-certificates

- slow. Demonstration of DNSSEC-supported applications such as reliably secure email will
- 116 support increased user demand for domain name system security.
- 117 The business value of the security platform that results from this project will include
- 118 improved privacy and security protections for users' operations, as well as expansion of
- the set of DNS security applications. It will encourage wider implementation of the
- 120 protocols that provide Internet users with confidence that entities to which they believe
- 121 they are connecting are the entities to which they are actually connecting.

122 **2. DESCRIPTION**

123 2.1 Purpose of the document

124 This document is intended to elicit comments regarding the utility of DNS-based secure 125 email; the proposed approach to composing a DNS-based secure email platform; 126 interest in participating in a DNS-based secure email proof-of-concept demonstration; 127 characteristics that are desired or required in a DNS-based secure email platform; and 128 provide technical, implementation, standards, and best-practices documentation 129 required to make a DNS-based secure email platform a useful and desirable element of 120 provide technical technology information

130 organizations' information technology infrastructures.

131 **2.2** Audience

132 The NCCoE is seeking providers of off-the shelf information technology security products 133 who can contribute components and expertise to the development a proof-of-concept 134 security platform that provides trustworthy mail server-to-mail server email exchanges 135 across organizational boundaries. Particular products and expertise sought include email 136 client systems, DNS/DNSSEC services, mail transfer agents, and X.509 cryptographic key 137 certificate sources (components and services). Collaborators are being sought to provide 138 components and expertise for DNS resolvers (stub and recursive) for DNSSEC, 139 authoritative DNS servers for DNSSEC signed zones, S/MIME certificates mail servers 140 and mail security components, extended validation and domain validation TLS 141 certificates. Although this initial project description focuses on SMTP over TLS and 142 S/MIME, it does not necessarily rule out inclusion of other off-the-shelf standards-based 143 components and capabilities that are compatible with DNSSEC. Comments and 144 suggestions regarding approaches to achieving the project goal are solicited.

- 145 Anticipated users for the product of this activity include IT systems owners and
- 146 administrators and organizations and individuals who desire reliable negotiation of
- security services and reliable sources of keying material for cryptographic source
- authentication, content integrity protection, and confidentiality protection. Comments
- 149 regarding desirable performance, security, cost, integration, and usability characteristics
- 150 for the building block are also solicited.

151 **2.3 Goal**

152 The DNS-based secure email building block project will demonstrate a security platform

153 that provides trustworthy email exchanges across organizational boundaries. The

- 154 project includes authentication of mail servers, signing and encryption of email, and
- 155 binding cryptographic key certificates to the servers.

156 2.4 Background

157 Both private industry and the government are concerned about email security and the 158 use of email as an attack vector for cyber crime. Business operations are heavily reliant 159 on email exchanges and need to protect the confidentiality of business information, the 160 integrity of transactions, and privacy of individuals. Cryptographic services are used to 161 authenticate the source of email messages, protect against undetected unauthorized 162 alteration of messages in transit, and maintain message confidentiality. Efficiency and 163 policies support reliance on mail servers to provide cryptographic protection for email rather than on end-to-end security operated by individual users. However, organizations 164 165 need to protect their server-based email security mechanisms against intrusion and 166 man-in-the-middle attacks during the automated cryptographic service negotiation 167 process. In the absence of an appropriate combination of DNSSEC and certificate-based 168 protections, any of these attacks can result in reading or modification of information by 169 unauthorized third parties. The attacks can also enable an attacker to pose as one of the 170 parties to an email exchange and send email that contains links to malware-ridden 171 websites. If other content in a fraudulent message successfully motivates the user to 172 click on the link or the user's system is configured to automatically follow some links or 173 download content other than text, the malware will infect the user's system. Inclusion 174 of links to malware is a major factor in most confirmed data breaches. Consequences of 175 such breaches can range from exposure of sensitive or private information, to enabling 176 fraudulent activity by the attacker posing as the victimized user, to disabling or 177 destroying the user's system—or that of the user's parent organization. Beyond 178 avoidance of negative consequences to users, improved email security can also serve as 179 a marketing discriminator for email service providers.

180 DNSSEC protects against unauthorized modifications to domain name information and

- 181 consequent connection to incorrect devices. In spite of the dangers of failure to
- 182 authenticate the identities of network devices, adoption of DNSSEC has been slow.
- 183 Demonstration of DNSSEC-supported applications such as reliably secure email will
- 184 support increased user demand for domain name system security.

185 **2.5 Scope**

186 The scope of this building block project includes demonstration and explanation of how 187 to effectively implement a security platform composed of off-the-shelf components that

188 provides trustworthy mail server-to-mail server email exchanges across organizational

- 189 boundaries. The DNSSEC-based DANE protocol will be used to authenticate servers and
- 190 certificates by binding the X.509 certificates used for TLS to DNS names verified by

191 DNSSEC (example references include IETF RFCs 6394, 6698, 7218, 5321, 5751, draft-ietf-192 dane-smime-02, and draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-17). This project will provide tools 193 to encrypt email traffic between servers, allow individual email users to digitally sign 194 and/or encrypt email messages to other end users, and allow individual email users to 195 obtain other users' certificates in order to validate signed email or send encrypted 196 email. In addition, the secure email platform or organization responsible for the email 197 platform will generate information that can be queried by email recipients to identify 198 valid email senders for a domain and that a given message originated from one of the 199 valid senders. The project will include an email sending policy consistent with a stated 200 security policy that can be parsed by receiving servers so that receiving servers can 201 apply the correct security checks and report back the correctness of the email stream. 202 Documentation of the resulting platform will include statements of security and privacy 203 policies and standards (e.g., IETF RFCs) supported, technical specifications for hardware 204 and software, implementation requirements, and a mapping of implementation requirements to the applicable policies, standards, and best practices. The secure email 205 206 project will involve composition/adaptation of a variety of off-the shelf components, 207 some potential sources for which have been identified.

208 2.6 Assumptions

209 The DNS-based secure email building block project assumes, and is dependent upon, the

- availability of off-the shelf information technology security products for and subject
- 211 matter experts on trustworthy mail server-to-mail server email exchanges across
- organizational boundaries. Particular products and expertise on which the project is
- dependent include those for client systems, DNS/DNSSEC services, mail transfer agents,
 and X.509 cryptographic key certificate sources (CA's and certificate management
- 214 and X.Sos cryptographic key certificate sources (CA's and certificate management215 components). DNS resolvers (stub and recursive) for DNSSEC validation, authoritative
- 216 DNS servers for DNSSEC signed zones, and mail server/mail security components.

217 **3. S**CENARIOS

- The building block project currently envisages two usage scenarios for DANE-enabledsecure email:
- 220 1. "ordinary" email where the email exchanges between two organizations' 221 email servers are carried over TLS, and the TLS key management is 222 protected by DANE and DNSSEC 223 2. end-to-end signed email, where the email exchanges between 224 organizations are carried over TLS as in (1), the email messages are 225 signed and verified with S/MIME on the end-users' client devices, and the 226 S/MIME key management is protected by DANE and DNSSEC 227 228 In both scenarios, private certificates are generated by Certificate Authorities (CAs). Self-229 signed certificates will not be used in either scenario.
- 230

- 231 This building block does not include an end-to-end encrypted email scenario; for
- 232 example, a scenario in which the email messages are encrypted and decrypted with
- 233 S/MIME on the end-users' client devices.
- 234

235 In the two supported scenarios, encryption is performed on bulk exchanges between 236 email services. The only per-message cryptography is digital signatures. This addresses 237 the main security concerns in enterprise environments, which are the target of the 238 project, but not necessarily those of individual users who may also want to reduce 239 information disclosure to their email providers. The two scenarios that are included may 240 serve as enablers for end-to-end encryption. Participation by parties having a primarily 241 end-to-end encryption focus may succeed in generating industry support for the 242 building blocks needed to support end-to-end encryption.

243

244 3.1 Usage Scenario 1

An individual needs to enter into an email exchange with an individual in another

- organization that requires transfer of protected personally identifiable information (PII).
- 247 Each individual exchanges email via the respective parent organizations' mail servers.

248 User connections to their organizations' respective mail servers are established and

- 249 maintained within a physically protected zone of control.
- 250 The privacy policy of the parent organizations requires encryption of the PII being
- exchanged. The security afforded by the cryptographic process is dependent on the

252 confidentiality of encryption keys such that no unauthorized third party has access to

- the encryption keys employed. The mail servers are configured to use X.509 certificates
- that convey keying material to protect the integrity of the encryption keys during an
- 255 encryption key establishment process. DNSSEC protocols are employed to ensure that
- each sending mail server is actually connected to the legitimate and authorized
- 257 receiving mail server from which its X.509 certificate is obtained.
- DNSSEC protocols are used to provide assurance that the originating user's mail server connects to the intended recipient's mail server. DANE protocols are employed to bind the cryptographic keying material to the appropriate server. TLS protocols are employed to negotiate the cryptography and protocols to be employed in the email exchange in which the PII is transferred. Encryption of the email message is accomplished by the originator's email server, and decryption of the email message is accomplished by the
- 264 recipient's email server using the X.509 certificate and standard server libraries.
- 265 Demonstration of the security platform in this scenario will include an attempt by a
- 266 fraudulent mail server to pose as the legitimate mail server for the receiver of the email
- and a man-in-the-middle attacker to attempt to notify the originating party that no
- 268 encryption service is available for the desired destination with the objective of achieving
- an unencrypted transmission of the email. Both attempts should fail due to use of
- 270 DNSSEC/DANE protocols.

271 3.2 Usage Scenario 2

An individual needs to enter into an email exchange with an individual in another organization that authorizes transfer of a large sum of money from the originator's organization to the recipient's organization. Each individual exchanges email via the respective parent organizations' mail servers. User connections to their organizations' respective mail servers are established and maintained within a physically protected zone of control.

- 278 The policy of the parent organizations requires cryptographic digital signature of the
- transaction to maintain integrity protection for the exchange (authorized source and
- 280 destination, and content unchanged from that entered by the sender). The security
- afforded by the cryptographic process is dependent on the confidentiality of signature
- keys such that no unauthorized third party has access to the secret keys employed.
- 283 S/MIME is the protocol used for electronic mail. Each organization generates X.509
- 284 certificates for their users to encode the public portion of their signature key. These
- 285 certificates are then encoded in the DNS using the appropriate DANE DNS record type.
- 286 DNSSEC protocols are used to provide assurance that the originating user's mail server connects to the intended recipient's mail server. DANE protocols are employed to bind 287 288 the cryptographic keying material to the appropriate server and individual user digital 289 signature certificates. TLS protocols are employed to negotiate the cryptography to be 290 employed in the email exchange in which the authorization is provided for the funds 291 transfer. Digital signature of the email message is accomplished by the originator's email 292 client, and checking the correctness of the signature (hence the integrity of the 293 authorization provided in the email message is accomplished by the recipient's email 294 client).
- 295 Demonstration of the security platform in this scenario will include an attempt by a 296 fraudulent actor to pose as the originator of the email and a man-in-the-middle attacker 297 to attempt to notify the receiving party that no digital signature certificate is available 298 for the purported sender with the objective of achieving an unsecured transmission of 299 the email. Both attempts should fail due to use of DNSSEC/DANE protocols.

300 4. CURRENT BUILDING BLOCK CHALLENGES

- 301 The DNS-Based Email Security building block faces some technical challenges, such as
- 302 split DNS resolution, limitations of DNSSEC as a trust model, security and usability trade-
- 303 offs in provisioning of certificates in DNS zone files, and DNS-based queries for
- 304 individuals and groups, and extension to additional protocols. However, the success of
- the building block effort will be heavily dependent on our ability to address the
- 306 following business challenges:

307 4.1 First Challenge

- 308 For the building block to result in the building block's adoption in the marketplace and
- in its effective use, participation by client systems and mail server developers and
- 310 vendors is essential and requires the implementation of the new servers by a significant
- 311 number of participants.

312 4.2 Second Challenge

- 313 The security platform resulting from this building block project will require X.509
- 314 certificate sources from established CAs if it is to result in large-scale adoption.

315 4.3 Third Challenge

- The security platform involves composition of a significant number of components from different vendors. Although application program interfaces(APIs) have been developed that should permit interoperability, long-term support of these APIs will have to be
- developed to provide stability in the face of version changes to individual components.

320 **5. RELEVANT STANDARDS**

- 321 Standards relevant to the building block described in this initial plan include the322 following:
- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation 323 324 List (CRL) Profile; IETF RFC 2459; Housley (SPYRUS), Ford (Verisign), Polk (NIST), 325 Solo (Citicorp); January 1999 326 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Federal Information 327 Processing Standard (FIPS), FIPS 140-2, May 2001 328 Federal S/MIME V3 Client Profile, NIST Special Publication, SP 800-49, Chernick, 329 November 2002 330 Threat Analysis of the Domain Name System (DNS), IETF RFC 3833, Atkins (IHTFP) 331 Consulting) and Austein (ISC), August 2004 332 Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security; NIST Special Publication; SP 800-45 Ver. 2; 333 Tracy, Jansen, Scarfone, Butterfield; February 2007 334 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation 335 List (CRL) Profile; Proposed Standard; IETF RFC 5280; Cooper (NIST), Santesson (Microsoft), Farrell (Trinity College, Dublin), Boeyen (Entrust), Housley (Vigil 336 337 Security), Polk (NIST); May 2008 338 Securing the Federal Government's Domain Name System Infrastructure, 339 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 340 Memorandum for Chief Information Officers, M-08-23, August 22, 2008 341 Internet Message Format, IETF RFC 5322, Resnick, October 2008 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, IETF RFC 5321, Draft Standard, Kleinstein, October 342 • 343 2008.

344 •	Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Revised Draft, Federal
345 346 • 347 348	Information Processing Standard (FIPS), FIPS 140-3, December 2009 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME), Version 3.2, Message Specification, Proposed Standard, IETF RFC 5751, ISSN: 2070-1721, Ramsdell (Brute Squad Labs) and Turner (IECA), January 2010
 349 350 351 352 	Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems: A security Lifecycle Approach, NIST Special Publication, SP 800-37 Rev. 1, Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative; February 2010 with updates as of June 5, 2014
353 • 354	Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6; NIST Special Publication, SP 800- 119; Frankel, Graveman, Pearce, Rooks; December 2010
355 • 356 357	Use Cases and Requirements for DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), IETF RFC 6394, ISSN: 2070-1721, Barnes (BBN Technologies), October 2011
358 • 359 360	The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security Protocol: TLSA, Proposed Standard, IETF RFC 6698, ISSN: 2070-1721, Hoffman (VPN Consortium) and Schlyter (Kirei AB), August 2012
361 • 362 363	Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, Proposed Standard, IETF RFC 6818, ISSN: 2070-1721, Yee (AKAYLA), January 2013
364 • 365 366	Security and Privacy Controls For Federal Information Systems And Organizations, NIST Special Publication, SP 800-53 Rev. 4, Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, April 2013
367 • 368	A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems; NIST Special Publication; SP 800-130; Barker, Branstad, Smid, Chokhani; August 2013
369 • 370	Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain Names For S/MIME, IETF Internet Draft, draft-ietf-dane-smime-02, September 30, 2013.
371 • 372	Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide, NIST Special Publication, SP 800-81-2, Chandramouli and Rose, September 2013
373 • 374	Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, National Institute of Standards and Technology, February 12, 2014
375 • 376 377	Adding Acronyms to Simplify Conversations about DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), IETF RFC 7218, ISSN: 2070-1721, Gudmundsson (Shinkuro Inc.), April 2014
378 • 379 380	Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations; NIST Special Publication; SP 800-52 Rev. 1; Polk, McKay, Chokhani; April 2014
381 • 382	Systems Security Engineering: An Integrated Approach to Building Trustworthy Resilient Systems, Draft, NIST Special Publication, SP 800-160, May, 12, 2014

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- Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain Names for S/MIME, draft-ietf-dane-smime-08, Hoffman (VPN Consortium) and Schlyter (Kirei AB), February 20, 2015
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 Dukhovni (Two Sigma) and Hardaker (Parsons), May 26, 2015
- 394 6. DESIRED SOLUTION CHARACTERISTICS

The building block will consist of a proof-of-concept security platform, composed of offthe-shelf components, that provides trustworthy mail server-to-mail server email
exchanges across organizational boundaries. The DANE protocol will be used to
authenticate servers and certificates in two roles in the Security for Email Project by
binding the X.509 certificates used for

- Transport Layer Security (TLS) to DNS names verified by DNSSEC and supporting
 the use of these certificates in the mail server to mail server communication
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405 It will encrypt email traffic between servers, allow individual email users to digitally sign and/or encrypt email messages to other end users, and allow individual email users to 406 407 obtain other users' certificates in order to validate signed email or send encrypted 408 email. The project will include an email sending policy consistent with a stated privacy 409 policy that can be parsed by receiving servers so that receiving servers can apply the 410 correct security checks and report back the correctness of the email stream. 411 Documentation of the resulting platform will include statements of security and privacy 412 policies and standards (e.g., IETF RFCs) supported, technical specifications for hardware 413 and software, implementation requirements, and a mapping of implementation 414 requirements to the applicable policies, standards, and best practices. The secure email 415 building block will involve composition of a variety of components that will be provided 416 by a number of different vendors. Client systems, DNS/DNSSEC services, mail transfer 417 agents, and certificate providers (CAs) are generally involved. DNS resolvers (stub and 418 recursive) for DNSSEC validation, authoritative DNS servers for DNSSEC signed zones, 419 mail server/mail security systems, S/MIME certificates, and extended validation and 420 domain validation TLS certificates are expected to be included in the solution.

421 7. SECURITY CONTROL MAP

- 422 This table maps the characteristics of the commercial products that the NCCoE will apply
- 423 to this cybersecurity challenge to the applicable standards and best practices described
- 424 in the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (CSF), and other
- 425 NIST activities. This exercise is meant to demonstrate the real-world applicability of
- 426 standards and best practices, but does not imply that products with these
- 427 characteristics will meet your industry's requirements for regulatory approval or
- 428 accreditation. Correct implementation of the security platform resulting from this
- 429 project will support achievement of improved maturity in the *Identify, Protect, and*
- 430 *Detect* functions identified in the Cybersecurity Framework.

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative
			Reference
IDENTIFY (ID)	Asset Management	ID.AM-3: Organizational	CCS CSC 1
	(ID.AM): The data,	communication and data	COBIT 5 DSS05.02
	personnel, devices,	flows are mapped ¹	ISA 6443-2-1:2009
	systems, and facilities		4.2.3.4
	that enable the		ISO/IEC 27001:2013
	organization to achieve		A.13.2.1
	business purposes are		NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
	identified and managed		4 AC-4, CA-3, CA-9,
	consistent with their		PL-8
	relative importance to	ID.AM-4: External	COBIT 5 APO02.02
	business objectives and	information systems are	ISO/IEC 27001:2013
	the organization's risk	catalogued. ²	A.11.2.6
	strategy.		NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
			4
			AC-20, SA-9
	Risk Assessment	ID.RA-6: Risk responses	COBIT 5 APO 12.05,
	(ID.RA): The	are identified and	APO 13.02
	organization	prioritized	NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
	understands the		4
	cybersecurity risk to		PM-4, PM-9
	organizational		
	operations,		
	organizational assets,		
	and individuals.		
PROTECT (PR)	Data Security (PR.DS):	PR.AC-5: Network	COBIT 5 APO 13.01,
	Information and	Integrity is protected,	DSS01.04, DSS05.03
	records (data) are	incorporating network	ISA 6443-2-1:2009
	managed consistent	segregation where	4.3.3.6.6
	with the organization's	appropriate	ISA 6443-3-3:2013
	risk strategy to protect		SR 1.13, SR .2.6

431 Table 1: Security Control Map

Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative
			Reference
	the confidentiality,		ISO/IEC 27001:2013
	integrity, and		A.6.2.2, A.13.1.1,
	availability of		A.13.2.1
	information.		NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
			4
			AC-17, AC-19, AC-20
		PR.DS-2: Data in transit is	ISA 6443-2-1:2009
		protected	4.3.3.4
			ISA 62443-3-3:2013
			SR 3.1, SR 3.8
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013
			A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3,
			A.13.2.1
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
			4
			AC-4, SC-7
		PR.DS-5: Protections	CCS CSC 17
		against leaks are	COBIT 5 APO01.06
		implemented	ISA 6443-3-3:2013
			SR 5.2
			ISO/IEC 27001:2013
		A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1,	
			A.7.1.2, A7.3.1,
		A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3,	
			A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2,
			A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1,
			A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5,
			A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1,
			A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4,
			A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
			4
		AC-4, AC-5, AC-6,	
			PE-19, PS-3, PS-6,
			SC-7, SC-8, SC-13,
		SC-31, SI-4	
	PR.DS-6: Integrity	ISA 6443-3-3:2013	
	checking mechanisms are	SR 3.1, SR 3.3, SR 3.4,	
	used to verify software,	SR 3.8	
	firmware, and	ISO/IEC 27001:2013	
	information integrity	A.12.2.1, A.12.5.1,	
			A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
			4
			SI-7


Function	Category	Subcategory	Informative
			Reference
	Protective Technology	PR.PT-4:	CCS CSC 7
	(PR.PT): Technical	Communications and	COBIT 5 DSS05.02,
	security solutions are	control networks are	APO 13.01
	managed to ensure the	protected	ISA 62443-3-3:2013
	security and resilience		SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8,
	of systems ands assets,		SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1,
	consistent with related		SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1,
	policies, procedures,		SR 7.6
	and agreements.		ISO/IEC 27001:2013
			A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1
			NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
			4
			AC-4, AC-17, AC-18,
			CP-8, SC-7
DETECT (DE)	Security Continuous	DE.CM-8: Monitoring for	COBIT 5 BAI03.10
	Monitoring (DE.CM):	unauthorized personnel,	ISA 62443-2-1:2009
	The information system	connections, devices, and	SR 4.2.3.1, SR 4.2.3.7
	and assets re	software is performed	ISO/IEC 27001:2013
	monitored at discrete		A.12.6.1
	intervals to identify		NIST SP 800-53 Rev.
	cybersecurity events		4
	and verify the		RA-5
	effectiveness of		
	protective measures.		

432 ¹ It is necessary to understand to what devices one is connected to be sure of organizational data flows[.]

433 ² It is necessary to understand to what devices one is actually connecting to understand what external
434 systems is part of the actual enterprise.

435 **8. HIGH-LEVEL ARCHITECTURE**

- The figure below is a high-level depiction of email functionality where DNS-based
- 437 security for email is used. In this example architecture, encryption is actually performed
- 438 by the email servers in both scenarios to be demonstrated. Encryption is performed on
- 439 bulk exchanges between email services. This addresses the main security concerns in
- 440 enterprise environments, which are the target of the project, but not necessarily those
- 441 of individual users who may also want to reduce information disclosure to their email
- 442 providers. The only per-message cryptography is digital signatures. In the second
- scenario, digital signature protection is provided by the clients.



444

445 Figure 1. High-Level Architecture

446

447 9. COMPONENT LIST

- 448 Client systems
- DNS/DNSSEC services
- Mail transfer agents
- DNS resolvers (stub and recursive) for DNSSEC validation
- Authoritative DNS servers for DNSSEC signed zones
- 453 Mail server/mail security systems
- S/MIME certificates
- Extended validation and domain validation TLS certificates

456 APPENDIX A - RISK ASSESSMENT

- 457 Both public and private sector business operations are heavily reliant on email
- 458 exchanges. The need to protect business plans and tactics; the integrity of transactions,
- 459 financial and other proprietary information; and privacy of employees and clients are
- 460 factors that motivate organizations to secure their email.

- 461 Email, unless protected by cryptographic integrity and confidentiality mechanisms is
- 462 inherently susceptible to being read or modified by unauthorized individuals and
- 463 processes. Unprotected email is also commonly used as an attack vector for insertion of
- 464 malware into organizations' and users' systems. Whether the service desired is
- 465 authentication of the source of an email message, assurance that the message has not
- been altered by an unauthorized party, or message confidentiality, cryptographic
- 467 functions are usually employed.

Economies of scale and a need for uniform implementation drive most enterprises to
rely on mail servers to provide security to the members of an enterprise rather than
end-to-end security operated by individual users. Most server-based email security
mechanisms are vulnerable to attacks involving

- 472 1. faked or fraudulent key certificates
- 473 2. otherwise invalid certificates
- 474 3. failure to actually invoke a security process as a result of connection to or475 through a fraudulent server
- 476 The consequences most often involve unauthorized reading or modification of
- 477 information or fraudulently causing legitimate parties to bypass the protection
- 478 mechanisms altogether. Use of email as an attack vector for phishing and insertion of
- 479 malware is a persistent problem because users continue to click on links to malware-
- 480 ridden websites in fraudulent emails, a major factor in most confirmed data breaches.
- 481 Sources of threats to public and private sector organizations and individuals include 482 malicious individuals, unscrupulous competitors, professional criminals and criminal 483 enterprises, law enforcement and regulatory investigators, and nation states seeking
- 484 political, commercial, or military advantage.
- Some examples of consequences of exploitation of unprotected email and email whose
 protection mechanism have been bypassed or defeated include the following:
- 487 Privacy breaches due to exposure of PII to unauthorized individuals • 488 Regulatory or reputational consequences of privacy breaches ٠ 489 Expenses resulting from notification and corrective action required as a result of 490 privacy breaches 491 Damage to individual or organizational reputations due to exposure of the 492 individual's or organization's information to and by unauthorized entities 493 Illicit authorization of business transactions, including financial transactions • 494 Intercept and blocking of business-critical transactions • 495 Legal and regulatory consequences due to intercept and blocking, modification, ٠ 496 and/or pre-mature exposure of individuals' and organizations' information

- 497 Loss of IT and/or dependent operational service availability resulting from
 498 insertion of destructive malware
- Interruption of business-critical operations due to loss of IT and/or dependent
 operational service availability resulting from insertion of destructive malware

501 **APPENDIX B - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Program Interface
СА	Certificate Authority
CCS CSC	Council on CyberSecurity Top 20 Critical Security Controls
COBIT	Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology
DANE	DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
DNS	Domain Name System
DNSSEC	Domain Name System Security Extensions
EMAIL	Electronic Mail
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HTTPS	Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IOT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet Protocol
IPSEC	Internet Security Protocol
ISA	Instrumentation, Systems, and Automation Society
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
NCCoE	National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
RFC	Request for Comments
S/MIME	Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
SMTP	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SP	Special Publication
TLS	Transport Layer Security

502 **APPENDIX C – GLOSSARY**

Application Program Interface	A software intermediary that makes it possible for application programs to interact with each other and share data
Cryptographic Key	In cryptography, a key is a piece of information that determines the functional output of a cryptographic algorithm or cipher. Without a key, the algorithm would produce no useful result.
Cryptography	The enciphering and deciphering of messages in secret code or cipher; also, the computerized encoding and decoding of information
Digital Signature	The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented with a supporting infrastructure and policy, provides the services of:
	1. Origin authentication,
	2. Data integrity, and
	3. Signer non-repudiation.
Domain Name System	A system for naming computers and network services that is organized into a hierarchy of domains. DNS naming is used in networks such as the Internet to locate computers and services through user-friendly names.
Encryption	The process of changing plaintext into ciphertext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Entity	An individual (person), organization, device or process.
Malware	A computer program that is covertly inserted into another program with the intent to destroy data, run destructive or intrusive programs, or otherwise compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim's data, applications, or operating system.
Man-in-the- middle attack	n cryptography and computer security, a man-in-the-middle attack is an attack where the attacker secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between two parties who believe they are directly communicating with each other.
Public Key	a cryptographic key that can be obtained and used by anyone to encrypt messages intended for a particular recipient, such that the encrypted messages can be deciphered only by using a second key that is known only to the recipient (the private key).

Protocol A set of rules governing the format of data sent over the Internet or other network.

503 **APPENDIX D – REFERENCES**

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